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Abstract
Ireland’s economic development is intrinsically linked to its success at attracting Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI). For decades, indigenous industry has lagged behind the foreign-owned
sector, giving rise to concerns of a dualistic industrial structure. An over-reliance on FDI carries
a number of risks associated with its footloose nature and weak linkages in the domestic
economy. The development of a strong export-oriented indigenous sector is therefore seen as
essential to ensure sustainable economic growth and employment security. Since the 1990s,
Irish industrial policy has placed a greater emphasis on indigenous industry. At the same time
technological change and the decentralisation of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have
provided opportunities for small innovative firms.
This paper examines the internationalisation of indigenous start-ups that received support from
Enterprise Ireland, the government agency tasked with the development and growth of
indigenous industry. These firms are traced over time using the FAME database, supplemented
by other sources including websites and news reports. Survivors are found to have high levels
of internationalisation. Consistent with findings for other small economies, acquisitions are
often by foreign-owned MNEs. A blurring of the indigenous/foreign-ownership dichotomy
raises a number of questions including the degree of embeddedness of these firms in the
domestic economy, their FDI linkages, the ability of policy-makers to ensure local ownership,
and the relevance of indigenous ownership for a small peripheral economy in a highly
globalised and networked world.
Key words
High Technology Firms; Acquisition; Economic Development; Foreign Direct Investment.

1. Introduction
This study was motivated by a number of findings in an earlier paper by Barry et al (2012).
First, that private equity (PE) investment in Ireland was highly internationalised with substantial
inward investment, compared with other European economies over the period 1996-2006.2
Second, that on average, almost 80 per cent of PE investment in Ireland over the period 19902010 was venture capital (VC). These two findings suggest a high level of inward investment
into Irish-based start-ups by foreign investors. The third finding of interest from Barry et al
(2012) was that trade sales were the most popular exit mode for VC in Ireland, far higher than
1
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in Europe generally, at 42 per cent over 2004-2010 compared to a European average of 26 per
cent in the same period. In addition to these findings, there were a number of news reports of
the foreign acquisition of various Irish technology start-ups. Together, these suggest the
possibility of both substantial foreign investment into Irish indigenous industry and the risk that
Irish firms are bought by foreign firms and therefore cease to be Irish-owned. In the latter case,
efforts to build a strong, self-sustaining, exporting indigenous industry may be in vain. In
addition, substantial involvement of foreign owners in indigenous industry raises the question
of the meaning and economic implications of indigeneity, for example are these firms less
embedded in the local economy and hence more footloose than might be expected of indigenous
industry?
As a preliminary analysis, this paper examines the outcomes for 222 High-Potential Start-Ups
(HPSUs) supported by Enterprise Ireland, the Irish agency tasked with the development and
growth of Irish-owned industry. These firms were registered as HPSUs by Enterprise Ireland
over the years 2009-2011, a period of economic crisis in Ireland. 3 This paper reports on some
of the characteristics of these firms and particularly focuses on ownership outcomes, on the rate
of acquisition and the extent of indigeneity of the firms. This will form part of a wider study
that looks at a number of aspects of the internationalisation of HPSUs in terms of activity in
international markets, links with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ireland and reasons for
acquisition.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the role of indigenous industry within
Irish economic policy. Various issues that arise in developing indigenous exporting industry in
a peripheral economy and outcomes after VC exit are discussed in Section 3. The data sources
and research approach are explained in Section 4. Section 5 reports some preliminary results.
Some tentative conclusions follow, together with a discussion of the future plans for this
research.

2. Indigenous Industry within Irish Economic Policy
The over-riding concern of Irish industrial policy since Independence, in the 1920s, has been
job creation. At Independence, the Irish economy was underdeveloped and, due to the problems
associated with late industrialisation, the market failed to create the requisite number of jobs.
Consequently, emigration was high. Although the protectionist economic policy adopted in the
1930s and 1940s, with an emphasis on import-substitution and Irish ownership of industry,
resulted in growth in manufacturing employment and higher standards of living, neither were on
the scale required and high levels of emigration continued. Furthermore, the 1950s brought a
balance-of-payments crisis.
Ireland made its first tentative steps in attracting FDI in the 1950s through a system of grants
and tax concessions.4 Breznitz (2012) argues that foreign-owned MNEs were expected to
provide jobs more quickly than was possible through the longer-term development of
indigenous industry and these jobs were immediately measureable and achievable. Another
3
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reason for efforts to provide concessions to foreign industry that was specifically exportoriented was that these new firms would not be competing with incumbent industry on the Irish
domestic market. Ultimately, more employment, prosperity, and lower levels of emigration
resulted. FDI gained further momentum after EU entry. Since then Ireland’s economic
development has been intrinsically linked to its success at attracting FDI.
In contrast the indigenous sector has lagged behind. Whether because of indigenous firms being
considered rent-seekers, or a tunnel-vision on the part of state agencies, it has been argued that
Irish indigenous industry has been neglected by the State, leading to a dualistic industrial
structure. An over-reliance on FDI carries a number of risks associated with its perceived
footloose nature and weak linkages in the domestic economy. The development of a strong
indigenous sector is therefore considered essential to ensure sustainable economic growth, and
employment security. With a small domestic market, Irish-based firms need to be exportoriented from early on. The policy emphasis is therefore on growing the exporting indigenous
sector. Although the importance of a strong exporting indigenous sector and concern over the
reliance of foreign ownership has been a consistent theme in Ireland for a number of decades,
the development of a self-sustaining export-oriented indigenous industrial sector is a goal that
has long eluded policy-makers.
Table 1, which excludes the finance sector, compares indigenous and foreign-owned enterprises
in Ireland in 2014. Indigenous firms are far more numerous, but smaller, with only four
employees on average, compared with an average of almost 84 employees for foreign-owned
enterprises. Consequently, although less than two per cent of enterprises are foreign-owned, the
sector accounts for almost one-quarter of all employment. Turnover and Gross Value Added
(GVA) per employee are also lower in the indigenous sector.
Table 1: Comparisons of Indigenous and Foreign-Owned Industry in Business Sectors
excluding Finance, 2014
Indigenous

Foreign-Owned

Average employees per enterprise

4.0

83.8

Average turnover per enterprise (€m)

0.9

64.3

Average turnover per employee (€m)

0.2

0.8

Gross Value Added per employee (€m)

0.1

0.2

245603

3774

98.5

1.5

983331

316305

Nos. of Enterprises
Percentage of total enterprises
Nos. Employed

Percentage of Employment
75.7
Source: Author’s own calculations from Structural Business Statistics, CSO

24.3

The 1990s saw the State introduce a number of initiatives to support the development of the
indigenous sector. This policy shift was spurred by the growth and development of an
indigenous software industry, together with criticism in both the Telesis Report of 1981and
Culliton Report in 1992 highlighting the importance of a strong self-sustaining indigenous
industry. Enterprise Ireland was established as the government agency to support the
development and growth of indigenous industry. At the same time technological changes and
the decentralisation of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) provided market opportunities for
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small innovative firms. Concomitant with these changes were a number of developments
boosting the venture capital (VC) market in Ireland.
One such policy initiative is the support targeted at High-Potential Start-Ups (HPSUs).
Enterprise Ireland defines a High Potential Start-Up (HPSU) to potential clients on its website
as
“a start-up venture that is:
 Introducing a new or innovative product or service to international markets.
 Involved in manufacturing or internationally traded services.
 Capable of creating 10 jobs in Ireland and realising €1 million in sales within three to
four years of starting up.
 Led by an experienced management team.
 Headquartered and controlled in Ireland.
 Less than five years old from the date of your company’s registration”
(Enterprise Ireland website)
Enterprise Ireland provides a number of supports to HPSUs, depending on the stage of the
firm’s development. Much of its financial support involves the co-funding of firms with venture
capitalists. Enterprise Ireland has been supporting firms in this way since the 1990s. In 2011, its
then CEO, Frank Ryan, proclaimed that “Enterprise Ireland is the largest venture capitalist in
Europe" (O’Donoghue, 2015)

3. Developing and Growing Internationalised Indigenous Industry
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘indigenous’ as “originating or occurring naturally in a
particular place; native”. A similar definition is given in the Cambridge English Dictionary:
“naturally existing in a place or country rather than arriving from another place.” However,
Enterprise Ireland requires only that the firm is “headquartered and controlled in Ireland” so
will support foreign investors if they establish a business in Ireland.
Start-up enterprises find it difficult to access traditional sources of finance such as bank loans
and other debt financing instruments. Reasons include high risk or uncertainty, an unproven
product or concept, a high level of intangible assets, lack of collateral, lack of a track record,
low turnover with many years of negative cashflow in prospect, and information asymmetries
(Baygan and Freudenberg, 2000; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Hogan and Hutson, 2005; Lerner, 2009;
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). These problems are particularly acute for high-technology
firms because their greater information asymmetries and levels of intangibles (such as in the
software industry) make them difficult to value (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2001). Cumming
and MacIntosh (2001) argue that this leads to longer investment durations in high-tech firms as
it takes more time for cashflow to turn positive and exit is difficult due to the problems
associated with valuation. Long maturing times can lead to VC market failure where a maturing
time is beyond the lifespan of a VC fund, this is especially likely in the biotechnology or
medical devices sectors (Messica and Agmon, 2008). Common sources of finance are for hightech start-ups are VC funds or angel investors as well as government backed grant or tax
incentive equity schemes (Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). Indeed early investors are often
family and friends. Given the level of risk, VC-backed projects have high failure rates, and
venture capitalists therefore expect high-returns from the few successful projects to compensate
for the many failures (Kenney et al, 2002).
4

VC is defined as long-term equity capital provided to early-stage companies, covering seed,
start-up, early-stage, and expansion funds. As VC plays an important role in the financing of
high-tech start-up industry and as the co-funding of HPSUs with VC is an important part of the
support offered by Enterprise Ireland, a number of aspects of the VC market are worth noting.
First, long maturing times mean that the firm may only turn profitable long after the life of the
VC fund. In such cases there can be a role for government intervention in supporting the firm
and in helping obtain further financing. Second, the VC investment cycle can be quite volatile.
State agencies can play a role in smoothing out the VC investment cycle and solve the problems
associated with volatility (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Messica and Agmon, 2008). Third, VC funds
are oligopolistic with most of the high-risk capital globally held by a few large financial
institutions in the US and Western Europe (Agmon, 2006). Fourth, drivers of cross-border VC
flows include the distance between home and host countries, and language and colonial ties.5
Syndication of overseas deals, often undertaken by local VC firms, means that language and
other cultural ties are particularly important. Important regional benefits from the support of
HPSUs are direct job creation and indirect effects from knowledge spillovers result in the social
benefits from R&D outweighing the private benefits (Lerner, 1996). The existence of such
spillovers is a valid argument in favour of government intervention in the development of
innovative start-ups (Lerner, 2009) as support for the early entrepreneurs in a new industry will
create external economies leading to the establishment of more firms. Economies of
agglomeration, including the development of pools of skilled labour and sub-suppliers, arise
from the clustering of VC-supported industry. Shane (2009) suggests that the VC-backing of a
firm is a good indication to industrial agencies of its growth potential.
Given that one focus of this paper is the ownership outcomes of firms a few years after
receiving support from Enterprise Ireland, the VC exit process is also important to note. VC
divestment may occur in a number of ways. Successful exits will be largely through trade sales
(where the investee firm is sold to another in the same industry), or through IPOs. Agmon and
Messica (2009) argue that the VC exit process is a direct outcome of two aspects of VC: Firstly,
the need for change and secondly, the need to harvest the investment (i.e. through the capital
gain on exit). The aim of venture capitalists is to ultimately harvest their investments when the
time is suitable (Megginson, 2004). As noted earlier, Barry et al (2012) found that trade sales
were especially popular as a mode of VC exit in Ireland. Arguing that IPOs have better returns
than other modes of exit, Mulcahy (2005) suggests the poor performance of the Irish Stock
Exchange as one reason for the popularity of trade sales over IPOs for Irish VC divestment.
Another factor may be early divestment from Irish enterprise as Jeng and Wells (2000) point
out that IPOs are more important for later-stage investments than for exit at an early-stage.
Barry et al (2012) find low levels of later-stage VC. Together with the high level of trade sales
in Ireland, this suggests either a lack of access to later-stage finance for expansion or a
reluctance, or inability, on the part of venture capitalists or entrepreneurs to further grow their
firms. Mulcahy (2005) suggests that most Irish start-ups perceive themselves as too small to go
public and opt instead for trade sales. Interestingly, Mason and Brown (2010:46) argue that VC
funds prefer trade sales to IPOs as “major shareholders are ‘locked-in’ after and IPO” and that
some venture capitalists had to be talked into an IPO. Venture capitalists generally want to exit
within a short few years, Mason and Brown (2010) suggest three to seven years. Mason and
Brown (2010) recommend that policy interventions on VC exit should include promoting IPOs
5
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as the mode of VC exit in order to maintain independence of local enterprise, and facilitating
entrepreneurial recycling by the cashed-out entrepreneurs. Trade sales may not just be the
choice of the VC fund, however. The intention of the entrepreneur may have always been to sell
the firm early rather than to continue to grow it. Mason and Brown (2013) suggest that,
although there is evidence that VC funds increasingly favour trade sales, other reasons may be
to acquire necessary resources for further growth of the business, or that the original objective
of the entrepreneur may always have been to sell. Wennberg and DeTienne (2014) point out
that exit intentions are formed early and vary across entrepreneurs. Where a business has been
developed from a proprietary product or service, the entrepreneur’s plan may have always been
to ultimately cash-in by selling the intellectual property to another firm.
Given the high level of trade sales of Irish start-ups, the reasons for such acquisitions and the
outcomes for the acquired firms are worth examining. According to Mason and Harrison
(2006), there are both demand-side and supply-side reasons why larger firms acquire small
technology firms. On the demand-side, there is the need for larger firms, operating in
oligopolistic markets to retain their competitive edge through innovation. New technology tends
to be developed by young small innovative firms whereas in-house R&D activities in larger
firms are limited to incremental changes in technology (Mason and Harrison, 2006). Therefore,
MNEs will buy small innovative firms obtain their proprietary knowledge in order to maintain
competitiveness. Keller and Block (2012) argue that SMEs, rather than large MNEs, are now
commonly responsible for innovation, one factor being the adoption of ‘open innovation’
policies by large corporations rather than undertaking R&D in house as in the past. Evidence for
this according to Keller and Block (2012) is found in the jobs available for PhD level scientists
and engineers in the US which are predominantly in SMEs rather than in large firms. O’Malley
and O’Gorman (2001) also point to the lower entry barriers and consequent lower concentration
of the software industry compared to other industries allowing the establishment of small firms,
often to serve specialised niches. On the supply-side are the reasons for small firms to need or
seek acquisition. Start-ups face various barriers to further growth. In particular, small firms face
barriers to entry into markets especially foreign markets (an inability to develop distribution
channels, for example) and they often lack the finance necessary to develop markets for their
product or service. As a result, many such firms will either fail or stay small, while others will
sell to larger firms in an effort to access markets or finance (Mason and Harrison, 2006). In
their study of High-Growth Firms (HGFs) in Scotland, Mason and Brown (2010) find that a
‘significant numbers’ of HGFs are acquired as subsidiaries by MNEs, particularly if located in
technology sectors.6 Reasons include the need to access finance or managerial expertise or
distribution channels (Mason and Brown, 2010). Entrepreneurs may also have aimed to sell
(Mason and Brown, 2010).
Acquisition of indigenous industry may have a negative impact on the local economy,
depending on what happens post-acquisition. If the business gains from an injection of funds
and management expertise then the acquisition is likely to be positive for the local economy. On
the other hand, if it is downsized or closed, the impact may be negative. Closure or downsizing
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HGFs tend to be larger than the HPSUs in this sample, defined by Mason and Brown (2010:7), in line
with the OECD definition, as firms with “average annualised growth in employees or turnover greater
than 20% per annum, over a three year period, and with more than 10 employees in the beginning of the
observation period.” Another difference between their study and the one reported here is that Scotland is
regarded as a ‘rustbelt’ region whereas Ireland is a late industrialiser.
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tends to happen more in the medium-term rather than immediately. Mason and Harrison (2006)
note a consensus in the literature of a negative medium-term impact of such acquisition on the
local economy. In particular, they point to the tendency for firms in the UK periphery (such as
Scotland) to be bought by firms from the core (such as South-East England), further weakening
the periphery through the loss of higher-order jobs and local business linkages. They further cite
studies that show that where technology companies in Canada and Israel that had struggled to
compete against US firms in the US market, sold out to US firms, they tended to only retain the
R&D function.
However, Mason and Harrison (2006) point out that most studies are limited to the
manufacturing sector. Irish HPSUs tend to be in services. Similarly, Mason and Brown (2010)
find that most HGFs in their study were engaged in Business-to- Business (B2B) services and
speculate that these services provide niches that can be easily filled by small firms. Such firms
had on-going relationships with their customers (Mason and Brown, 2010). Some were ‘born
global’ having no sales in Scotland, while others were heavily internationalised with a number
of locations outside Scotland. There are positive outcomes from acquisition. ‘Cashed-out’
entrepreneurs may set up a new business or act as business angels (Mason and Brown, 2010).
Mason and Brown (2010) find both serial and portfolio entrepreneurs in their sample. Some had
sold previous businesses and used the funds to finance new ventures. Some had a number of
firms but might run down existing businesses if they spotted a new opportunity that showed
greater likelihood of success. Some entrepreneurs started their own businesses after the
company they had worked for was acquired. Some churn therefore occurs. Mason and Brown
(2010) say this confirms the importance of Schumpeterian creative destruction in economic
development.
Indigenous industry is expected to be more embedded in the domestic economy, and therefore
less footloose, than FDI. However, if indigenous industry is heavily internationalised with its
focus on overseas markets, it may not be particularly embedded in the local economy. Mason
and Brown (2010) observe that HGFs in Scotland have a small local “footprint” often being
limited to the Head Office. This is necessary because of the necessity for a presence in export
markets, close to the customer. They conclude that HGFs in small peripheral regions can have a
minor impact on the local economy although they do create high quality jobs in the
headquarters. Mason and Brown (2010) argue that this makes such firms particularly vulnerable
to post-acquisition closure, especially if the only local involvement has been the head office.
Firms that are mostly doing business overseas are likely to be freer in their choice of location.
Mason and Brown (2010) in their interviews with HGF founders in Scotland, find that the
choice of Scotland as a location for the firm was because it was where the founders lived and
that they remained in Scotland because they wanted to live there. Some interviewees said that
their base could be anywhere although others felt that their location was part of their brand
(Mason and Brown, 2010).
Given the dominance of FDI on the Irish industrial landscape, opportunities for embeddedness
may be limited to B2B opportunities with MNE subsidiaries in the Irish economy. Finding low
levels of productivity spillovers from manufacturing FDI to local industry, Ruane and Uǧur
(2005) point to an inconsistency in Irish industrial policy that has promoted ‘enclave’ FDI due
to its emphasis on export-orientation and a corporate tax policy which favours imported rather
than locally-sourced inputs, as it encourages profit-shifting to Ireland via transfer pricing. This
has reduced opportunities for FDI spillovers. However, knowledge spillovers are likely to have
7

been important to the development of the indigenous software sector in Ireland, which was
particularly successful in the 1990s. The Review of Industrial Policy and Performance (2003)
found that one-third of software entrepreneurs had worked in a foreign-owned electronics firm
immediately prior to establishing their own firm and two-thirds had at some stage in their
careers. Similarly, O’Malley and O’Gorman (2001) and Ó Riain (2004) found that a substantial
number of those involved in the indigenous software sector were former MNE employees while
others had worked in the industry overseas.
Mason and Brown (2010) question whether public policy interventions are worthwhile in cases
where the firm is acquired. They question whether the State is ‘fattening-up’ firms for foreign
owners to ultimately benefit. In this scenario the policy of promoting indigenous industry
results in either expanding foreign-ownership in the economy (where the local firm remains in
business) or overseas (where the local operation is shut-down post-acquisition). Mason and
Brown (2010) find that firms may grow post-acquisition or may eventually close and their
intellectual property extracted. They recommend that policy interventions on VC exit should
include promoting IPOs as the mode of VC exit in order to maintain independence of local
enterprise, and facilitating entrepreneurial recycling by the cashed-out entrepreneurs.
In the networked economy, decentralised and downsized MNEs engage with small firms
through outsourcing, subcontracting and partnering, thereby maintaining what Harrison (1994)
argues is a process of “concentration without centralization”. In this view MNEs continue to
dominate economically. Outsourcing, the debundling of MNE activities, and the relocation of
corporate head offices makes it difficult to ascribe national identities to firms. For example,
head office locations are often different from other homes: legal home, financial home, home of
managerial talent (Desai, 2009). Internationalised SMEs in small peripheral economies may
therefore also not be fully ‘indigenous’ in the sense of being locally owned.

4. Data and Methodology
The firms in this study were collected from the ‘High-Potential Start-Up Showcase’
publications produced by Enterprise Ireland for the three-year period 2009-2011. This period
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, as the intention in the first instance is to examine
firm outcomes after VC exit, this is a suitable period as it allows firms to be traced for
approximately four to seven years post-receipt of Enterprise Ireland funding. It may therefore
capture outcomes post-VC exit and the three to four year horizon in which Enterprise Ireland
expects HPSUs to reach employment and sales goals.7 Second, the timeframe covers years
following the financial crisis and severe recession in Ireland, when many businesses closed and
new start-ups are particularly important. Third, it gives a reasonably manageable data size for a
preliminary analysis. There are 222 firms in the dataset. These are traced over time using
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME database, supplemented by other sources including websites and
news reports.
FAME is an enterprise-level database covering the UK and Ireland only (including the Channel
Islands). Mason and Brown (2010) used FAME to identify the HGFs in their study and to
gather data for some descriptive statistics. They point out a number of disadvantages of the
7

The data were collected over 2016-2017. In many cases, the most recent data in FAME are for 2015
however.

8

FAME database however. First, some information is out-of-date as some companies may have
filed late accounts; second, as companies have different financial years, the information is not
directly comparable in time; third, there is some double-counting and time lags in recording
acquisitions and closures. Furthermore, FAME only includes companies with a separate legal
status and incorporated in the country. This means that some entities cannot be found and
changes in country of incorporation make the firm disappear from the database. This can occur,
for example, where firms moved their head office abroad.
Unlike Mason and Brown (2010), this paper does not use FAME to identify the firms but only
to find information about their various characteristics and outcomes. The firms are traced in the
database and information on size (numbers of employees), sector (NACE Rev.2 codes), year of
incorporation, year of closure or acquisition, directors, shareholders, and subsidiaries was
collected, where relevant. In line with Lesher and Miroudot (2008), who utilise Bureau van
Dijk’s Amadeus database in their study of FDI spillovers, the ‘global ultimate owner’ (GUO)
information is used to identify the owner of the firm. Because FAME only covers Ireland and
the UK, further details of the ultimate owners (such as nationality) had to be traced through
further searches if the owner was not an Irish or UK firm. Firms in liquidation are treated as
dissolved.
As this study is a firm-level analysis, issues arise such as heterogeneity and the sample is
therefore currently too small to undertake a very detailed analysis. Other difficulties arise from
changes of name and also ownership which can be quite volatile. In this paper, the most recent
information, at the time of data collection, is used. In some instances, firms were in FAME
under alternative names, which in a number of instances had to be traced through searching
through numerous news reports. Some were traced using the founder’s name. In other cases,
there are a number of related companies, this caused difficulties in finding the one in receipt of
Enterprise Ireland funding. There is an inevitable survivor bias, as dissolved companies are
difficult to trace, some never filed accounts.

5. Preliminary Results
Most Irish HPSUs are engaged in B2B services similar to the firms studied by Mason and
Brown (2010). They are most often in Software, other IT-related, Fintech or Biotech industries.
The most populated Nace 2-digit sectors are shown in Table 2. News reports suggest that a
number have partnerships or on-going relationships with their customers. For example,
Inishtech was reported in 2009 to have partnered with Microsoft IP Ventures to relaunch
Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection (SLP) Services (Wauters, 2009). This suggests
complementarities with FDI.
Table 2: Most populated Nace Rev.2 Two-digit Sectors
Nace
2-digit
58

Description

Nos. of
Firms

Percentage

Publishing Activities (Includes software publishing)

49

22

62

Computer Programming, Consultancy and Related Activities

23

10

72

Scientific Research and Development

22

10

82

Office Administration, Office Support and Other Business
Support Activities

15

7

9

70

Activities of Head Offices; Management Consultancy
Activities

14

6

Employment data are unavailable for many firms in the FAME database, particularly if they are
dissolved. Consequently, Table 3 reports the employment levels of just 126 HPSUs. Most
HPSUs remained small, with few reaching the 10 or more employees, expected by Enterprise
Ireland within three to four years of start-up. Indeed, more than one-fifth had just one or two
employees, these are generally the founders.
Table 3: Firm Size
Employment

Nos. of Firms

Percentage

<10

72

57

10<50

48

38

50<100

5

4

100<250

1

1

126

100

Total

As the main focus of this paper is the indigeneity of HPSUs, the remaining discussion focuses
on the acquired firms, or those that have moved head office abroad. Table 4 shows that, of the
222 firms in the database, 11 per cent had been acquired by the end of this study and another
four per cent had become headquartered abroad. More than one-quarter had dissolved, four of
which were dissolved subsequent to acquisition. This left just under 60 per cent headquartered
in Ireland. Therefore, of the 165 surviving firms, 73, or just over 44 per cent, had either been
acquired, moved abroad (at least in terms of the locations of their headquarters), were majorityowned by State agencies (most commonly Enterprise Ireland, presumably awaiting new round
of funding), or, in one case, by an investment company.
Table 4: Outcomes
Outcome
Acquired (and dissolved)
Became Foreign

Nos. of Firms

Percentage

25 (4)

11 (2)

9

4

38

17

1

1

No Change

92

41

Dissolved

57

26

222

100

Majority Owned by State Agency
Majority Owned by Investment Company

Total

Out of the 57 non-acquired dissolved firms, more than one quarter were dissolved within a year
of establishment, and over half within three years.
Table 5 shows that the GUO of almost half of the acquired firms is headquartered in the US.8
Anglophone owners dominate with a further seven firms now in UK ownership and one in
Australian. In total, 80 per cent of acquired firms were bought by owners headquartered in
anglophone countries.
8
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Table 5
Country of GUO

Nos. of Firms

Percentage

Australia

1

4

France

1

4

Germany

1

4

Japan

1

4

Sweden

1

4

Switzerland

1

4

United Kingdom

7

28

United States

12

48

Total

25

100

Acquiring firms are in the same industry and often held a minority interest in the company at an
earlier date. The main rationale for the acquisition is ownership of the proprietary knowledge or
service. One firm, Mingoa, was acquired by a US MNE, Microsemi, that already had an Irish
subsidiary.
Firms are further traced using websites and news reports, to get a better picture of the events
that led to and shaped the acquisition, the intentions of the founders, the outcomes in terms of
what then happens to the Irish subsidiary and the outcomes for the founders – do they become
employees of the MNE or do they leave? If they leave, what happens to the cashed-out
entrepreneur? The data collection is not yet complete so statistics are not reported here.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper reports the preliminary results for a group of 222 Irish HPSUs supported by
Enterprise Ireland in 2009-2011. It finds that most Irish HPSUs are in B2B services, particularly
in software and IT-related activities, fintech and in biotech. Most firms remain small, many not
growing beyond their founders. These findings are in line with those of Mason and Brown
(2010, 2013). A number of firms (11 per cent) were acquired by foreign firms, some moved
headquarters abroad, while others had moved to Ireland from abroad, or their founders were
recent immigrants to Ireland.9 Acquiring firms were in the same industry and were mostly from
anglophone countries, particularly the US. Searches of websites and news reports suggest that
survivors have strong business links internationally and many have business links with MNEs,
including ones operating in Ireland. Another issue for Irish HPSUs is likely to be Brexit, as
many had business links to the UK. Some parts of the research are incomplete however, so
many results are only partially reported here.
In the case of foreign acquisitions, or where firms move their head office abroad, there is an
irony that public policy aimed at developing indigenous industry leads ultimately to the growth
of foreign-owned industry instead. If the State really wants to develop self-sustaining
indigenous industry, it needs to consider ways to support and maintain Irish ownership. This
may be achievable by supporting firms at the later-stage to grow and reach IPO stage.
Alternatively, a change of culture may be required to encourage Irish entrepreneurs to envisage
heading a larger company rather than selling. Another important factor that needs to be
9

Not quantified here as this requires the wider website and news search, which is incomplete.
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considered in maintaining indigenous ownership is access to markets, often provided through
foreign ownership. However, in light of the shifts in international business and in the
configuration of firms, the question may be more one of how to create Irish-owned MNEs.
The rationale for building a self-sustaining export-oriented indigenous sector is based on the
risks associated with the footloose nature of foreign investment and the stronger linkages to the
wider economy thought to be provided by indigenous industry. The external focus of HPSUs
suggests a possible lack of embeddedness in the Irish economy, and the desire to be closer to
the market is a likely reason for the relocation abroad of head offices by some firms. It also
appears likely that a number, though headquartered in Ireland, have more activity abroad. This
raises the question of the economic meaning of the location of a firm’s headquarters. Many
companies during website searches, did not report any physical location, suggesting that this is
irrelevant to them. A blurring of the indigenous/foreign-ownership dichotomy raises a number
of questions including the degree of embeddedness of these firms in the domestic economy,
their FDI linkages, the ability of policy-makers to ensure local ownership, and the relevance of
indigenous ownership for a small peripheral economy in a highly globalised and networked
world.
Future plans for this research are the completion of data collection on international business
linkages and linkages with FDI. Further searches are necessary also to complete the data on
founder motivations and reasons for acquisition. It is also intended to extend the database to
cover a greater number of years, to both include a larger number of firms and to generate a
longer time-series.

References
Agmon, T. (2006) ‘Bringing Financial Economics into International Business Research: Taking
Advantage of a Paradigm Change’ Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 575-577
Agmon, T. and A. Messica (2009) ‘Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The role of Private
Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms from Emerging Markets’ Management
International Review, 49(1), 11-26
Aizenman, J. and J. Kendall (2012) ‘The Internationalization of Venture Capital’ Journal of
Economic Studies, 39(5), 488-511 an earlier version is available as Aizenman, J. and J. Kendall
(2008) ‘The Internationalization of Venture Capital and Private Equity ‘ NBER WP14344
Barry, F., C. O'Mahony and B. Sax (2012) 'Venture Capital in Ireland in Comparative
Perspective' Irish Journal of Management, 32 (1), 1-26.
Baygan, G. and M. Freudenberg (2000) The Internationalisation of Venture Capital Activity in
OECD Countries: Implications for Measurement and Policy. OECD Science, Technology and
Industry Working Papers DSTI/DOC (2000)7, OECD Publishing.
Breznitz, D. (2012) ‘Ideas, Structure, State Action and Economic Growth: Rethinking the Irish
Miracle’ Review of International Political Economy, 19(1), 87-113.

12

Cumming, D. and J. MacIntosh (2001) ‘Venture Capital Investment Duration in Canada and the
United States’ Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 11(4), 445-463.
Desai, M. (2009) ‘The Decentering of the Global Firm’ World Economy, 32(9), 1271-1290.
Enterprise Equity Venture Capital (2012) Polecat secures €850,000 investment from AIB Seed
Capital Fund, private investors and Enterprise Ireland, 23rd February. Available at
http://www.enterpriseequity.ie/2012/02/polecat-secures-e850000-investment-from-aib-seedcapital-fund-private-investors-and-enterprise-ireland/ accessed 7th May 2017.
Enterprise Equity Venture Capital (2014) Microsemi Acquires Mingoa, 23rd July. Available at
http://www.enterpriseequity.ie/2014/07/microsemi-acquires-mingoa/ accessed 16th May 2016.
Enterprise Ireland website accessed 7th May 2017.
Halo Business Angels Network (HBAN) (2014, 9th September). Available at
http://www.hban.org/News/Mingoa-sale-a-successful-exit-for-Boole-investors.363.html
accessed 5th May 2017.
Harrison, B. (1994) ‘The Small Firms Myth’ California Management Review, 36(3), 142-158.
Hogan, T. and E. Hutson (2005) ‘Capital Structure in New Technology-Based Firms: Evidence
from the Irish Software Sector’ Global Finance Journal, 15(3), 369-387.
Industrial Policy Review Group (1992) A Time for Change: Industrial Policy for the 1990s,
Stationery Office, Dublin. This is widely known as the “Culliton Report”.
Jeng, L. and P. Wells (2000) ‘The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence across
Countries’ Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, 241-289.
Keller, M. and F. Block (2012) ‘Explaining the Transformation in the US Innovation System:
the Impact of a Small Government Program’ Socio-Economic Review 11, 629–656.
Kennedy, J. (2012a) ‘Polecat Raises €850k to Focus on Decision Analytics Business’, Silicon
Republic, 24th February. Available at https://www.siliconrepublic.com/start-ups/polecat-raises850k-to-focus-on-decision-analytics-business accessed 7th May 2017.
Kennedy, J. (2012b) ‘US Cloud Player Egenera Buys Dublin Software Firm Fort
Technologies’, Silicon Republic, 5th December. Available at
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/us-cloud-player-egenera-buys-dublin-softwarefirm-fort-technologies accessed 7th May 2017.
Kenney, M., K. Han, and S. Tanaka (2002) ‘Scattering Geese: the Venture Capital Industries of
East Asia: a Report to the World Bank’ Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, UC
Berkeley.
Lerner, J. (1996) ‘The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Effects of the SBIR
Program’ National Bureau of Economic Research WP5753.

13

Lerner, J. (2009) Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship
and Venture Capital Have Failed--and What to Do About It, Princeton University Press.
Lesher, M. and Miroudot, S. (2008) ‘FDI Spillovers and Their Interrelationships with Trade’,
Working Paper No. 80, OECD Working Party of the Trade Committee.
Mac an Bhaird, C. and B. Lucey (2010) ‘Determinants of Capital Structure in Irish SMEs’
Small Business Economics, 35(3), 357-375.
Mason, C. and R. Brown ( 2010) High Growth Firms in Scotland Final Report for Scottish
Enterprise. Available at
https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/1364523/HGF_FINAL_REPORT_NOV_2010_1_.pdf
Mason, C. and R. Brown ( 2013) ‘Creating Good Public Policy to Support High-Growth Firms’
Small Business Economics, 40(2), 211-225.
Mason, C. and R. Harrison (2006) ‘After the exit: Acquisitions, Entrepreneurial Recycling and
Regional Economic Development’, Regional Studies, 40(1), 55-73.
Megginson, W. (2004) ‘Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?’ Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance, 16(1), 89-10.
Messica, A. and T. Agmon (2008) ‘Venture Capital Dynamics, the Public Sector and the High
Technology Industry’ International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management,
10(3), 227-242.
Mulcahy, D. (2005) ‘Angels and IPOs: Policies for Sustainable Equity Financing of Irish Small
Businesses’ Studies in Public Policy, 16, 1-123.
O’Donoghue, P. (2015) ‘Enterprise Ireland is Now Europe's Biggest VC fund’ Sunday
Independent, 18th January.
O'Malley, E. and C. O'Gorman (2001) ‘Competitive Advantage in the Irish Indigenous Software
Industry and the Role of Inward Foreign Direct Investment’ European Planning Studies, 9(3),
303-321.
Ó Riain, S. (2004) The Politics of High-Tech Growth: Developmental Network States in the
Global Economy, Cambridge University Press.
Percival, G. (2012) ‘US Cloud Firm Egenera Buys Fort Technologies’, The Irish Examiner, 6th
December.
Review of Industrial Policy and Performance (2003).
Ruane, F. and A. Uğur (2005) ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity Spillovers in Irish
Manufacturing Industry: Evidence from Plant Level Panel Data’ International Journal of the
Economics of Business, 12(1), 53-66.

14

Science Foundation of Ireland (SFI) (2009) ‘Irish Firm to Offer Faster and More Dynamic
Market Intelligence Data to Global Organisations’, 2nd December 2009. Available at
http://www.sfi.ie/news-resources/press-releases/irish-firm-to-offer-faster-and-more-dynamicmarket-intelligence-data-to-global-organisations.html. Accessed 7th May 2017.
Shane, S. (2009) ‘Why Encouraging More People to Become Entrepreneurs is Bad Public
Policy’ Small Business Economics, 33(2), 141-149.
Wauters, R (2009) ‘Irish Startup Reboots Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection Services
Unit’Tech Crunch. Available at https://techcrunch.com/2009/06/09/irish-startup-rebootsmicrosoft-software-licensing-and-protection-services-unit/ accessed 3rd May 2017
Wennberg, K. and D. DeTienne (2014) What Do We Really Mean When We Talk About
‘Exit’? A Critical Review of Research on Entrepreneurial Exit, International Small Business
Journal, 32(1), 4-16.

15

